内容简介
Thisbookexploresthepoliticsoffiscalauthority,focusingonthecentralizationoftaxationinLatinAmericaduringthetwentiethcentury.ThebookstudiesthisissueingreatdetailforthecaseofMexico.Thepolitical(andfiscal)fragmentationassociatedwithcivilwaratthebeginningofthecenturywaseventuallytransformedintoahighlycentralizedregime.Theanalysisshowsthatfiscalcentralizationcanbestbestudiedastheconsequenceofabargainstruckbetweenself-interestedregionalandnationalpoliticians.FiscalcentralizationwasmoreextremeinMexicothaninmostotherplacesintheworld,butthechallengesandproblemstackledbyMexicanpoliticianswerenotunique.ThebookthusanalyzesfiscalcentralizationandtheoriginsofintergovernmentalfinancialtransfersintheotherLatinAmericanfederalregimes,Argentina,Brazil,andVenezuela.Theanalysisshedslightonthefactorsthatexplaintheconsolidationoftaxauthorityindevelopingcountries.