内容简介
ThePowersoftheUniondevelopsandtestsanewtheoryofcentralizationandbureaucratizationintheEuropeanUnion.Usingoriginaldataspanningfivedecadesandamulti-methodapproach,FranchinoarguesthatmostEUlawsrelyextensivelyonnationaladministrationsforpolicyimplementationandprovideforamplenationaldiscretionaryauthority,whilelimitingtightlytheinvolvementoftheEuropeanCommission.However,whenCouncilministersdonotsharethesamepolicyobjectives,somehavetheincentivetolimitnationalexecutivediscretionandtorelymoreontheCommission.Majorityvotingfacilitatesthisoutcome,butthelimitedpolicyexpertiseofsupranationalbureaucratsandtheirbiasedviewsimpedeextensivesupranationaldelegation.Finally,theEuropeanParliamentsystematicallyattemptstolimitnationaldiscretion,especiallywhenitsviewsdifferfromministerialopinions,andtriestoincreasetheCommission'spolicyautonomy.Thebookcontributestowardsunderstandingpolitical-bureaucraticrelationsandevaluatestheimplicationsforEUdemocracyandsubsidiarity.