Ideas, Evidence, and Method：Hume's Skepticism and Naturalis

GracielaDePierrispresentsanovelinterpretationoftherelationshipbetweenskepticismandnaturalisminHume'sepistemology,andanewappraisalofHume'splacewithinearlymodernthought.WhereasadominanttrendinrecentHumescholarshipmaintainsthattherearenoskepticalargumentsconcerningcausationandinductioninBookI,PartIIIoftheTreatise,GracielaDePierrispresentsadetailedreadingoftheskepticalargumentshefindsthereandhowthisargumentinitiatesatrainofskepticalreasoningthatbeginsinPartIIIandculminatesinPartIV.ThisreasoningisframedbyHume'sversionofthemoderntheoryofideasdevelopedbyDescartesandLocke.Theskepticalimplicationsofthistheory,however,donotarise,asintraditionalinterpretationsofHume'sskepticism,fromthe'veilofperception.'TheyarisefromHume'selaborationofapresentational-phenomenologicalmodelofultimateevidence,accordingtowhichthereisalwaysajustificatorygapbetweenwhatisorhasbeenimmediatelypresentedtothemindandanyideasthatgobeyondit.Thishappens,paradigmatically,inthecausal-inductiveinference,and,asDePierrisargues,indemonstrativeinferenceaswell.Yet,inspiteofhisfirmcommitmenttoradicalskepticism,Humealsoacceptsthenaturalisticstandpointofscienceandcommonlife,andhedoesso,onthenovelinterpretationpresentedhere,becauseofanequallyfirmcommitmenttoNewtonianscienceingeneralandtheNewtonianinductivemethodinparticular.HumedefendstheNewtonianmethod(againstthemechanicalphilosophy)whilesimultaneouslyrejectingallattempts(includingthoseoftheNewtonians)tofindaplaceforthesupernaturalwithinourunderstandingofnature.