The Activity of Being：An Essay on Aristotle's Ontology

Understanding“whatsomethingis”isaprojectthathaslongoccupiedphilosophers.PerhapsnothinkerintheWesterntraditionhashadmoreinfluenceonhowweapproachthisquestionthanAristotle,whoseMetaphysicsremainsthelocusclassicusofrigorousexaminationsintothenatureofbeing.Now,inanelegantlyarguednewstudy,AryehKosmanreinterpretsAristotle’sontologyandcompelsustoreexaminesomeofourmostbasicassumptionsaboutthegreatphilosopher’sthought.ForAristotle,toask“whatsomethingis”istoinquireintoaspecificmodeofitsbeing,somethingordinarilyregardedasits“substance.”Buttounderstandsubstance,weneedtheconceptofenergeia—aGreektermusuallytranslatedas“actuality.”Inamoveoffar-reachingconsequence,Kosmanexplainsthatthecorrecttranslationofenergeiaisnot“actuality”but“activity.”WehavesubtlymisunderstoodtheMetaphysicsonthiscrucialpoint,saysKosman.Aristotleconceivesofsubstanceasakindofdynamicactivity,notsomeinertquality.Substanceissomethingactivelybeingwhatitis.KosmandemonstrateshowthisinsightsignificantlyaltersourunderstandingofanumberofimportantconceptsinAristotelianthought,fromaccountsofmotion,consciousness,andessencetoexplanationsofthenatureofanimalanddivinebeing.Whetheritisapproachedasanin-depthintroductiontoAristotle’smetaphysicsorasahighlyoriginalreassessmentsuretosparkdebate,therecanbenoargumentthatTheActivityofBeingisamajorcontributiontoourunderstandingofoneofphilosophy’smostimportantthinkers.