Liberalism with Excellence

Duringthepastseveraldecades,politicalphilosophershavefrequentlyclashedwithoneanotheroverthequestionwhethergovernmentsaremorallyrequiredtoremainneutralamongreasonableconceptionsofexcellenceandhumanflourishing.WhereasthenumerousfollowersofJohnRawls(andkindredphilosopherssuchasRonaldDworkin)havemaintainedthatarequirementofneutralityisindeedincumbentoneverysystemofgovernance,otherphilosophers—oftendesignatedas'perfectionists'—havearguedagainsttheexistenceofsucharequirement.LiberalismwithExcellenceentersthesedebatesnotbyplightingitselfunequivocallytoonesideortheother,butinsteadbyreconceivingeachofthesidesandthusbyredirectingthedebatesthathaveoccurredbetweenthem.Ontheonehand,thebookrejectstherequirementofneutralitybycontendingthatcertainsubsidiesforthepromotionofexcellenceinsundryareasofhumanendeavourcanbeproperandvitalusesofresourcesbygovernments.Advocatingsuchdeparturesfromtheconstraintofneutrality,thebookpresentsaversionofliberalismthatcanrightlybeclassifiedas'perfectionist'.Ontheotherhand,thespeciesofperfectionismespousedinLiberalismwithExcellencedivergesmarkedlyfromthetheoriesthathaveusuallybeensoclassified.Indeed,muchofthebookassailsvariousaspectsofthosetheories.Whatismore,theaspirationalperfectionismelaboratedintheclosingchaptersofthevolumeisreconcilableinmostkeyrespectswithasuitablyamplifiedversionofRawlsianism.Hence,byreconceivingboththeperfectionistsideandtheneutralistsideoftheprevailingdisputation,LiberalismwithExcellencecombinesandtransformstheirrespectiveinsights