Designing Federalism

Becauseoftheredistributivenatureofinstitutionsandtheavailabilityofimplementablealternativeswithdifferentdistributiveconsequences,thedesireoffederationmemberstochangeinstitutionalspecificsintheirfavorisapermanentfeatureofthefederalpoliticalprocess.Thisissofortworeasons.First,statesortheirequivalentsindemocraticfederationsusuallycansucceedinrenegotiatingtherulesiftheyfeelsufficientlymotivatedtodoso.Second,inthecaseofafederationitismoreorlessclearwhostandstobenefitfromanychangeininstitutions.Thus,theexistenceofanequilibriumofconstitutionallegitimacyatthepopularandelitelevelscannotbetakenforgranted.Theauthorsshowthatthepresenceinthepoliticalprocessofagentswhoare'naturallycommitted'tothestatus-quoinstitutionalarrangementcansufficetocoordinatevoterstoactasiftheysupportexistingconstitutionalarrangements.