Hume's Problem：Induction and the Justification of Belief

ColinHowsonoffersasolutiontooneofthecentral,unsolvedproblemsofWesternphilosophy,theproblemofinduction.Inthemid-eighteenthcenturyDavidHumearguedthatsuccessfulpredictiontellsusnothingaboutthetruthofthepredictingtheory.Nomatterhowmanyexperimentaltestsahypothesispasses,nothingcanbelegitimatelyinferredaboutitstruthorprobabletruth.Butphysicaltheoryroutinelypredictsthevaluesofobservablemagnitudestomanyplacesofdecimalsandwithinverysmallrangesoferror.Thechanceofthissortofpredictivesuccesswithoutatruetheoryseemssoremotethatthepossibilityshouldbedismissed.ThissuggeststhatHume'sargumentmustbewrong;butthereisstillnoconsensusonwhereexactlytheflawintheargumentlies.Howsonarguesthatthereisnoflaw,andexaminestheimplicationsofthisdisturbingconclusionfortherelationbetweenscienceanditsempiricalbase.